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Tom Regan, "The Natu re and Possibil-
ity of an Environmental Ethic," Envi-
ronmental Ethics, Vol. 3, No. f, 
Spring, 1981 
{A Second Opinion} 
In the December, 1981, issue of 
Ethics & Animals, Peter Wenz provided 
a clear, concise outline of Tom 
Regan's "The Nature and Possibility of 
an Envi ronmental Ethic." Wenz con-
cluded that "this helpful article clari-
fies the issues with which it deals and 
prepares the ground for further work 
in the area." I would disagree with 
that evaluation; I think Regan's con-
ception of environmental ethics is 
unpromising and his defense of that 
conception is insignificant. 
Regan's conception of environmental 
ethics seems to be guided by the 
desire for a firm foundation from 
which one may morally condemn not 
only individuals but also cultures and 
humanity in general when they do not 
care about preserving natural objects, 
including plants, rivers, and other 
nonconscious things. He recognizes 
that arguing for the preservation of 
nature on utilitarian grounds,on the 
grounds that natu ral objects express 
important cultural values, or on other 
homocentric, sentient-centric, or con-
. sCious-centric grounds will not pro-
vide him the fou ndation he wants. 
This is because cultural values may 
change and preserving natural objects 
may not always. be what is best for 
people, sentient bei ngs, or conscious 
beings. He seems to have conclud-
ed--rightly, I think--that the only 
way of securing the unvarying moral 
foundation for preservation which he 
wants would be to establish that natu-
ral objects have a morally significant 
good of their own; a good inherent in 
them, a good independent of their 
effects on or value for conscious, sen-
tient, or human beings. 
Regan does not attempt such an 
argument in this essay, nor in the 
others of his writings to which he 
here refers. Rather, he limits his 
case to showing that the proposition 
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that (some) nonconscious objects are 
inherently good (i) is not incoherent 
and (ii) must be true if the develop-
ment of environmental ethics is to be 
possible. I shall first consider his 
argument for the second of these con-
clusions, then. devote the. remainder of 
this review to arguments concerning 
the first conclusion. 
The basic problem with Regan's 
attempt to demonstrate that (some) 
nonconscious, natural objects must be 
inher'ently good if the development of 
environmental ethics is to be possible 
is that it begs the question. Regan's 
argument here consists of considering 
four other possible bases for environ-
mental ethics, showing that they can-
not "reasonably account for our duties 
regarding the environment" (30), and 
concluding that in the absence of any 
other viable alternative, environmental 
ethics must be based on accepting 
that (some) nonconscious objects are 
inherently good. Among these four. 
alternatives is a utilitarian environ-' 
mental ethics, which would preserve 
the natu ral environment because doing· 
so is important for the well-being of 
sentient beings, and an embodiment of 
cultural values environmental ethics, 
which would preserve nature because 
it expresses or symbolizes important 
cultu ral values, e. g., freedom, integ-
rity, and power. Regan finds these 
two alternatives inadequate because 
they would not commit us to preserv-
ing nature (Le., unmanufactured 
environments (26)) in situations where 
doing so would not benefit sentient 
beings or where the environment did 
not symbolize the cu rrent cultu ral 
values of those intending to destroy 
that environment. However, these 
limitations on the commitment to pre-
serving nature do not constitute 
objections to utilitarian or embodiment 
environmental ethics unless one pre-
sumes that among our duties regard-
ing the environment are duties to pre-
serve nature in situations where doing 
so has no benefit, either utilitarian or 
expressive, for the sentient beings 
who will be affected by the preserva-
tion of that environment. It is not 
obvious that we ha've such duties, and 
Regan does not even attempt to estab-
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lish that we have such duties. So, 
we would seem here to have a contro-
versial, crucial unjustified presump-
tionin Regan's argument. 
Another weakness in Regan's argu-
ment against a utilitarian environmen-
tal ethics can be found in· his claim 
(27) that a utilitarian environmental 
ethics would be susceptible to the fol-
lowing reductio: if we were capable of 
manufacturing an environment which 
would be significantly· more beneficial 
for sentient beings (including future 
generations and incorporating princi-
ples of fair distribution of this 
increase in the general welfare) and if 
it were the case that there was no 
more beneficial (for sentient beings) 
way for us to employ ou r energies 
and resources, then we ought, on 
utilitarian grounds, to replace the 
natural environment with this manufac-
tured environment. (Regan's brief 
statement of this reductio does not 
elaborate all the above conditions, but 
not to accept them would be to mis-
represent utilitarianism and to refute· 
a strawman.) Is this utilitarian con-
clusion absurd? Is it even wrong? Is 
it detrimental to developing a cohe-
rent, effective environmental ethics, 
given our current limited capacity for 
manufacturing beneficial environments? 
Some argument is needed to show that 
the answer. to any of these questions 
is "yes." Regan provides no such 
argument. . 
Rather, he moves on to claim that 
"in the world as it actually is, there 
are grounds for thinking that envi-
ronmental protection efforts favor the 
interests of a powerful elite rather 
than maximizing the pleasure of all" 
(27). This is supposed to show that 
even under current conditions, utilita-
rianism cannot justify preserving 
nature. However, these grounds are 
nothing but rhetorical flou rish. 
First, the fact that "rising property 
values in protected areas drive the 
poor out" does not. even suggest that 
the most effective way to maximize the 
general welfare, or even the welfare 
of the poor, would be to replace natu-
ral environments with "parking lots, 
condominiums, and plastic trees" (27). 
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Second, any viable utilitarian ethics 
will include provisions for minority 
opportunities (even for the elitel) and 
fai r distribution of benefits. There is 
no reason to believe that the general 
welfare will be maximized by forcing 
all of us to live the way only most of 
us want to. So utilitarianism would 
not undermine attempts to preserve 
some natu ral envi ronments, even if 
the majority did prefer manufactured 
environments. Finally, utilitarianism 
requires considering the pleasures of 
animals, as well as of humans, and 
indi rect contributions to pleasu re, 
such as providing oxygen, enriching 
the soil, and making other vital con-
tributions to the biosphere. "Plastic 
trees" hold no promise of fulfilling 
these needs. (Also, I see no reason 
why a utilitarian environmental ethics 
could not recognize the benefits 
obtained th rough having natu ral 
expressions of cultural (and trans-cul-
tural) values, thereby embracing the 
embodiment environmental ethics and 
dispelling the impression that a utilit-
arian environmental ethics must regard 
nature in a crudely instrumental 
way.) Consequently, the cu rrent 
prospects for the happiness of sen-
tient beings do not support Regan's 
claim that a utilitarian environmental 
ethics could not justify current pres-
ervation efforts .. 
It is trivially true that no principle 
for determining ou r duties regarding 
the environment which bases that 
determination on something other than 
the inherent goodness of the environ-
ment will be able to show that we 
have duties regarding the envi ronment 
independent of the well-being of other 
beings or things than the environ-
ment. That is, it is trivially true 
that any such principle will be unable 
to support Regan's conception of envi-
ronmental ethics and the duties which 
would follow from such an ethics. 
But since Regan does not even 
attempt to demonstrate that his con-
ception of envi ronmental ethics cor-
rectly expresses the sorts of duties 
we have regarding the environment, 
his conclusion here should be limited 
to saying that utilitarianism and 
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embodiment of cultural values do not 
provide adequate bases for the kind 
of envi ronmental ethics he wants. 
Before he can move on toconcludin-g 
that what he wants does, and the 
other theories do not "reasonably 
account for our duties regarding the 
environment," he will have to provide 
some credible arguments in favor not 
just of the logical possibility of his 
theory but also of its adequacy and 
accuracy. As it stands, he has given 
us no reason to believe that we must 
postulate the inherent goodness of 
nonconscious objects in order to 
account for our duties regarding the 
env ironment. 
Tu rning to Regan's other point, 
that it is logically possible for non-
conscious objects to be inherently 
good, his arguments for this proposi-
tion are limited to showing that some 
arguments against this proposition 
contain premises, interpretations, or 
presumptions which are not "self-evi-
dent and stand in need of rational 
defense, something not provided by 
the argument itself" (23). 
There is a certain amount of merely 
rhetorical flourish to such an objec-
tion, since no argument justifies its 
own definitions, presumptions, or 
premises. Still, Regan's defense of 
his proposition is probably invincible. 
If a conception of goodness as a sim-
ple, non-natural property, a la G. E. 
Moore, is not logically Cncoherent, 
then it will be impossible to prove 
that nonconscious objects cannot pos-
sibly be inherently good. As Moore's 
famous critique of naturalism amply 
demonstrated, a simple, non-natural 
property could (logically) be associ-
ated with anything. Regan does not 
openly subscribe to Moore's interpt'e-
tation of goodness--although it is hard 
to imagine any other interpreta'tion 
which could accommodate the claims he 
makes for his logically possible I know 
not what--but the logical possibility of 
such an interpretation, in conjunction 
with Regan's never explaining what 
makes something good, does explain 
why he can so easily refute attempts 
to prove that nonconscious objects 
cannot (logically) be inherently good. 
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It also explain why this defense of 
his position is so insignificant: intui-
tionism has long since proven a dead 
end, and what is needed to show 
there may be "something worth think-
ing about" (19) in Regan's conception 
of environmental ethics is not the 
merely logical possibility of resu rrect-
ing intuitionism but the substantive 
possibility of developing a conception 
of inherent goodness which will be 
able to make an advance over inter-
pretations of goodness based on hap-
piness or interests (the two options 
Regan criticizes). We need to be 
shown how Regan's conception of 
inherent goodness can help us under-
stand cases· or aspects of goodness 
which these other interpretations can-
not account for. 
In a previous article, "Feinberg on 
What Sorts of Beings Can Have 
Rights" (The Southern Jou rnal of Phi-
.Iosopl!y 1474 (1976)), to which he 
here refers several times, Regan 
argued (i) that something, e.g., a 
gardenia bush, can be good of its 
kind without reference to its relation 
to any conscious being and (ii) that 
since something, e.g., a car, can be 
good but not valued, there is a dis-
tinction between being valued, which 
is what requires consciousness, and 
being good, which is something the 
object is in its own right. Regan has 
come to reject the concept of being 
good of its kind as a basis for envi-
ronmental ethics because such good-
ness need not be morally significant, 
i.e., ·need not call for respect (33). 
However, he does still consider it an 
objective good that nonconscious 
things· may have independent of con-
scious bei ngs . But is even this 
reduced claim correct? . 
A plant's being good of its kind 
clearly does not depend on anyone's 
direct interest in the plant: weeds are 
often healthy, flourishing paradigms 
of thei r species. However, this does 
not show that plants are good inde-
pendent of conscious beings, for one 
obvious explanation of how even weeds 
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can be good of thei r kind is that they 
express the values of conscious 
beings, e.g., health, tenacity, fulfill-
ing one's potential, and survival. 
Regan acknowledges that the inherent 
goodness of nonconscious objects is a 
supervenient property (31), and if we 
interpret their non-instrumental, 
non-aesthetic goodness as the expres-
sive or symbolic value their other 
properties have (or can have or nor-
mally have or would have if observed) 
for conscious beings, then we can 
readily understand how this superve-
nientproperty arises. Especially the 
non-instrumental, non-aesthetic good-
ness of rivers, cliffs, and other inor-
ganic things seems to be intelligible 
only in this way. I really cannot imag-
ine how the undisturbed flowing of 
the Colorado River would be good in a 
world bereft of conscious beings--ex-
cept as a possibility for the use. or 
appreciation of conscious beings who 
might someday return. The water 
would move differently, the cliffs be 
formed differently, and the mud 
deposited differently if the river's 
flow were impeded, but in· a world 
bereft of (the possibility of) conscious 
beings, how would one pattern of 
movement, erosion, and sedimentation 
be better than another? Finally, some 
of the values expressed by natu ral 
objects in being good of their kind 
are moral values, e. g., freedom, 
which is why, as Regan emphasizes, 
the appropriate response to these nat-
ural objects is respect. So, the 
expressive interpretation of· a non-
conscious thing being good of its kind 
can even recognize that some of these 
things thereby acquire moral signifi-
cance. 
Of cou rse, offering this 
interpretation of the goodness of su r-
viving, flourishing, and otherwise 
being good of one's kind does not 
prove that it is logically impossible for 
there to be another interpretation of 
this goodness. But it does explain 
how this goodness is dependent on the 
objective properties of the noncons-
cious object, is supervenient, is not 
E&A 111/2 
crudely instrumental, is independent 
of our direct desires concerning the 
survival· or flourishing of the thing, 
and in some cases has moral signifi-
cance. It also shows that being good 
of its kind is not a kind of goodness 
that cannot be accounted for except 
by postulating a goodness noncons-
cious objects can have independent of 
.(the possibility of) conscious beings. 
Turning to Regan's other point in 
his contra- Feinberg essay, i. e., the 
distinction between being valued, 
which requires consciousness, and 
being good, which does not, this dis-
tinction can also be understood with-
out postulating a kind of goodness 
nonconscious objects can have inde-
pendent of (the possibility of) con-
scious beings. An unvalued car 
(Regan's example) can be good in the 
same wayan unseen apple can be red. 
"The unseen apple is red" can be 
understood to mean that its physical 
properties are such that if a being 
relevantly like us were to see the 
apple under normal lighting condi-
tions, the color that being would see 
is what we call "red." That is, the 
objective redness of the apple is its 
capacity to influence certain beings in 
a certain way. It has this capacity 
whether or not it ever affects such a 
being in this way. Similarly, "the 
unvalued car is good" may be under-
stood to mean that its physical prop-
erties are such that if a being rele-
vantly Ii ke us wanted reliable 
transportation, knew how to use a 
car, had the materials necessary for 
using a car, and came across this 
car, he would value it. This capacity 
is something the car has whether or 
not any being ever actually values the 
car. So, the car can be good even 
though never valued, and this is a 
supervenient goodness of the car 
itself. But this goodness retains an 
essential reference to the possible 
desires, beliefs, understandings, and 
other capabilities of conscious beings. 
Given these obvious, alternative 
interpretations of being good of one's 
kind and of being good though unva-
lued, Regan's arguments in his con-
tra- Feinberg essay fail to give us any 
reason to believe nonconscious objects 
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have independent goodness. 
Finally, in the present essay, as 
well as in the contra- Feinberg essay, 
Regan insists that "having an interest 
in X" may mean either being inter-
ested in X or that X will contribute to 
the individual's good, well-being, or 
welfare (20). He concludes from this 
that it is possible for nonconscious 
objects to have interests and, conse-
quently, a good of their own, since 
only the first alternative, being inter-
ested in X, requires consciousness. 
Regan is certainly correct in insist-· 
ing that one can have an interest in 
something in which he is not inter-
ested, e.g., his diet. But ordinarily 
this is because that something will 
affect what he does care about, e.g., 
his health, even though he does not 
realize it. Consider the following 
example: suppose there is a cream I 
do not know about which will cure 
baldness, that I am bald, but that I 
do not care (even subconsciously) 
whether or not I am bald or about any 
of the consequences of my baldness. 
Cou Id it be said that nevertheless, 
unbeknownst to me, I have an interest 
in that cream? That would be a 
strange thing to say, and the only 
way I can make any sense of such a 
claim is in terms of people normally 
wanting not to be bald and the possi~ 
bility that in spite of what I cu rrently 
thin k and feel. I will be happier if I 
get my hair back. But such an 
interpretation does not even suggest 
that nonconscious objects can have 
interests. Of cou rse, it is possible to 
stipulate that "P has an interest in X" 
may refer to situations in which P 
does not or cannot care about what 
will be produced by what he has an 
interest in. However, our common 
understanding of "p has an interest in 
X, even though he takes no interest 
in X" strongly suggests that the 
kinds of good, well-being, or welfare 
to which things in which one has an 
interest but takes no interest may 
contribute are limited to feelings of 
pleasure and pain, the fulfil\ment or 
frustration of wants and desi res, and 
other such conscious, sentient goods. 
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It seems fair to say that Regan has 
begged the question and been insensi-
tive to the meaning of "having an 
inter'est" by presuming that the kinds 
of good, well-being, or welfare to 
which the things in which one has an 
interest may contribute do not them-
selves essentially involve a reference 
to feelings, desir'es, and other things 
only conscious beings can have, 
Thus, having an interest in things in 
which one takes no interest does not 
indicate that interpretations of good-
ness which tie it to wants, desires, 
cares, hopes, happiness, etc" have 
left something out, something which 
requires postulating a goodness which 
nonconscious objects can have inde-
pendent of (the possibility of) con-
scious beings, 
Like Regan's other essays, this one 
is admirable for its clarity and organi-
zation. However, although it clearly 
indicates his personal dissatisfaction 
with other theories of goodness and 
envir'onmental ethics, this essay pro-
vides nothing in the way of a more 
adequate theory of goodness or envi-
ronmental ethics or even in the way of 
arguments for convincing those who 
do not share his unqualified commit-
ment to preserving nature or his 
dissatisfaction with other theories of 
nature's goodness that they ought to 
share his values. This essay merely 
raises the logical possibility of an I 
know not what and points in the 
di rection of mysterious, objective 
value properties, conflicts among 
moral goods that are in principle inca-
pable of r'ational adjudication (21), 
and some form of intuitionism, Follow-
ing such a path would seem to have 
scant chance of helping us secure 
serious philosophical attention for 
environmental ethics, Regan will have 
to find some positive arguments to 
show those of us interested in secur-
ing serious philosophical attention for 
envi ronmental ethics that. we cannot 
avoid this thorny path or, at least, 
that the path looks. promising before 
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his concept of environmental ethics 
can attain credibility and before we 
need conclude that we should follow· 
him on his adventure. 
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